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The Australia–India Security 
Declaration: The Quadrilateral Redux? 
David Brewster 
The Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Australia and India, 
made during Kevin Rudd’s visit to New Delhi in November 2009, is part of a 
number of security agreements being entered into across the Asia Pacific.  
For Australia the Declaration is a notable step in the process of developing a 
closer security relationship with India.  However, some grant it wider 
significance, seeing it as plugging a “missing link” in a web of bilateral 
security agreements connecting Australia, India, the United States and 
Japan—the four members of the so-called Quadrilateral security dialogue 
that was proposed and then quickly abandoned in 2007.  With the Australia-
India Declaration all four members of the putative “Quad” now have bilateral 
security arrangements with each other, facilitating the further development of 
their relationships.  Should, as some argue, the Declaration and other 
bilateral security arrangements be seen as heralding a coalition among Asia-
Pacific maritime powers implicitly aimed at containing China?  
This comment will argue that the Declaration is indicative of the growing 
strategic importance of India to Australia, a relationship which is likely to 
develop over time.  However, there are some important differences the 
security perspectives of New Delhi and Canberra, and the relationship is 
unlikely to be substantially defined by any perceived China threat.  This 
comment will first provide an overview of recent developments in the security 
relationships among Australia, the United States, Japan and India which 
have led some to see the development of an informal security coalition 
between them.  It will then examine the content of the Declaration and 
consider how it compares to the Japan-India Security Declaration.  Finally, it 
will consider the long-term significance of the Declaration and the likely 
shape of the security relationship between Australia and India in future 
years. 
Recent Developments in Security Relationships among 
Asia Pacific Maritime States  
The Australia-India Declaration is an outcome of two recent trends affecting 
Australia’s regional security relationships.  First, have been developments in 
the US “hub and spoke” alliance system that has existed in the Asia-Pacific 
since the 1950s, in which the United States forms the centre of a series of 
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bilateral alliances with key allies in the Asia-Pacific (most notably Japan, 
Australia and South Korea).  This system has been evolving in recent years 
through the development of additional security frameworks that facilitate 
direct dialogue and cooperation between US allies.  This trend has included 
the establishment of the Trilateral Security Dialogue among Australia, the 
United States and Japan (which was upgraded to foreign and defence 
ministerial level in 2006), the 2007 Australia-Japan Security Declaration and 
the 2009 Australia-South Korea Security Declaration, as well as a mooted 
security declaration between Japan and South Korea.1  The form of the 
security declaration, essentially a non-binding joint declaration of principles 
and understandings in security matters, was originally used as part of a 
revamp of the US-Japan alliance in the 1990s.  The form has been found to 
be particularly convenient in signaling common strategic perspectives and 
establishing a bilateral framework for the development of mechanisms for 
cooperation in security matters, without the need for binding treaty 
obligations.  Australia is now party to three such security declarations, 
although to date it has acted cautiously in giving them significant substance.2 
The second trend has been the improvements in security relations between 
India and the United States and its regional allies and friends.  Over the last 
decade or so, the United States has sought to develop a close strategic 
relationship with India, seeing it as an emerging regional power that might, at 
least in part, help balance the rising power of China.  After years of steady 
improvements in political, economic and security relations, in July 2007 India 
and the United States concluded negotiations on the so-called 123 nuclear 
agreement, which signaled the de facto recognition by the United States of 
India as a nuclear weapons state and a significant expansion of military and 
security relationships between them in coming years.3  In parallel, as part of 
its “Look East” policy, India has since the 1990s been steadily improving its 
economic, political and security relationships in East Asia, including with 
Singapore and other key ASEAN states.   
Over the past few years, Japan has also been active in developing its 
relationship with India.  In 2006, Japan and India declared a “strategic 
partnership” between them, with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe 
writing that: “It will not be a surprise if in another decade, Japan-India 
relations overtake Japan-US and Japan-China ties.”4  In early 2007, Prime 
Minister Abe proposed the so-called “Quadrilateral” initiative, under which 
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India would join a formal multilateral dialogue with Japan, the United States 
and Australia.  In an August 2007 address to the Indian parliament, Abe 
spoke of a "broader Asia" partnership of democracies and suggested that 
the India-Japan partnership would “evolve into an immense network 
spanning the entirety of the Pacific Ocean, incorporating the US and 
Australia”.5  At the same time, military to military links between the United 
States, India and Japan were significantly upgraded.  In April 2007, the first 
ever trilateral naval exercises were held between the United States, Japan 
and India in the Western Pacific and in August 2007, the annual India-US 
Malabar naval exercise was transformed into large-scale multilateral 
exercises in the Bay of Bengal involving the United States, India, Japan, 
Australia and Singapore.  These political and military initiatives, taken 
together, were seen by some as the beginnings of a four-way security 
alliance between the United States, India, Japan and Australia, aimed at 
balancing or containing a rising China.6  
China’s reaction to the Quadrilateral initiative and naval exercises in 2007 
was highly negative, including criticism that the initiatives resurrected “a 
cold-war mentality” and marked “the formation of a small NATO to resist 
China”.7  In May 2007 China issued formal diplomatic demarchés to India, 
Japan, the United States and Australia requesting explanations about the 
Quadrilateral proposal and in the following month Chinese President Hu 
Jintao pressed home the point by seeking “clarification” of India’s position in 
a face to face meeting with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.8  
By late 2007, much of the impetus of these developments had faded.  Over 
the course of 2007, each of Australia, India, the United States and Japan 
became increasingly hesitant about the Quadrilateral initiative.  Australia 
declined to participate further in the dialogue following preliminary 
discussions.  The Indian government also faced significant domestic political 
pressure against any perceived alliance with the United States.  Despite 
support for the Japanese proposal in parts of the Bush administration 
(including Vice President Cheney in particular), many in the US security 
community increasingly saw the proposal as unnecessarily provocative 
towards China.  In Japan there was significant criticism of the proposed 
dialogue from within the governing Liberal Democratic Party, the 
bureaucracy and the opposition.9  Following the resignation of Abe as 
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Japanese Prime Minister in September 2007, the new Japanese 
administration found it convenient to allow the proposal to lapse.  
While proposals for a formal multilateral security relationship involving 
Japan, India, Australia and the United States were quietly shelved, there 
remained a significant level of interest in both New Delhi and Tokyo for 
developing a broad-based relationship as a way of counterbalancing China.  
This led to a security declaration between Japan and India in October 2008, 
which will be discussed later.  
The Australia–India Security Declaration 
The Australia-India Declaration has many similarities with Australia’s security 
declarations with Japan in 2007 and South Korea in 2009, but also some 
important differences.  The Declaration identifies shared security interests, 
so-called “elements of cooperation” in eight specified areas and outlines 
consultative mechanisms to be implemented between them.  Key areas of 
cooperation identified in the Declaration include: 
• Information exchange and policy co-ordination in regional affairs 
• Bilateral cooperation within multilateral regional frameworks, 
particularly the East Asian Forum and the ASEAN Regional Forum 
• Defence dialogue and cooperation within the existing 2006 MOU on 
Defence Cooperation 
• Terrorism 
• Transnational organised crime 
• Disaster management 
• Maritime and aviation security 
• Law enforcement cooperation. 
The so-called “mechanisms of cooperation” in the Declaration lists ongoing 
consultation and cooperation expected to take place at various levels.  
Among other things, the Declaration calls for the exchange of visits between 
foreign ministers, defence policy talks between senior officials, staff talks and 
service exchanges, consultation between respective National Security 
Advisors, consultation on counter-terrorism including through the existing 
Joint Working Group on Counter-terrorism and sharing knowledge on 
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disaster prevention.  The Declaration also calls for the development of an 
“action plan” to provide detail on specific measures to advance 
cooperation—this is yet to come. 
One of the more noteworthy features of the Declaration is its explicit 
recognition of the importance of cooperation between Australia and India 
within existing multilateral regional institutions (the East Asia Summit and the 
ASEAN Regional Forum) and in the development of new regional economic, 
political and security arrangements.  While neither Australia nor India readily 
admit it, they are both geographical and cultural outsiders to East Asia, the 
current centre of gravity of the Asia Pacific region.  There are continuing 
suspicions about Australia’s participation in East Asian institutions and 
China, in particular, remains leery of seeing India as part of East Asia.  
Uncertainties about the place of Australia and India in recent Japanese 
proposals on new regional institutions are a reminder that Australia and India 
could do with some mutual support in this regard. 
Overall, the Australia-India Declaration should be seen as a notable step in 
the development of the bilateral security relationship.  However, a 
comparison with the Japan-India Security Declaration is instructive of some 
of the differences in perceptions in New Delhi and Canberra about regional 
security as well as differences in the degree of enthusiasm in pursuing a 
security relationship.  In particular, the China factor is very significant in the 
Japan-India relationship while Australian views on China are more 
ambivalent.  This difference is reflected in the Japan-India Declaration which 
affirms their “similar perceptions of the evolving environment in the region” 
(code for shared concerns about China).  In contrast, the Australia-India 
Declaration (presumably at Australia’s behest) steers clear of China, merely 
affirming a “shared desire to promote regional and global security.”  
Differences between the declarations also betray significant differences in 
New Delhi’s enthusiasm in pursuing relationships with Tokyo and Canberra. 
The Japan-India Declaration displays an apparent determination to 
undertake a prolonged and multi-faceted engagement and build a broad-
based relationship across multiple agencies that is simply not present in the 
Australia-India Declaration.  In addition to the consultative mechanisms 
prescribed in the Australia-India Declaration, the Japan-India Declaration 
prescribes consultation between Defense Ministers, the permanent Foreign 
and Defence Secretaries and Chiefs of Armed Services, navy to navy staff 
talks and a comprehensive security dialogue at the Director General/Joint 
Secretary level.  The Japan-India Declaration also specifies a range of 
military to military cooperation and exchanges including bilateral and 
multilateral exercises, coast guard cooperation and cooperation between 
space agencies, which are not addressed in the Australia-India Declaration.  
Differences in the significance given to the security relationships are also 
demonstrated in the joint prime-ministerial statements.  On signing the 
declaration, the Indian and Japanese Prime Ministers asserted that the 
David Brewster 
- 6 - Security Challenges  
strategic partnership between the two countries would become “an essential 
pillar for the future architecture of the region”10 while in contrast, the 
Australia-India Declaration was hardly mentioned in the joint statement 
capping Rudd’s visit to India.  While there may have been political reasons 
for the Indian government to want to downplay the Australia-India 
Declaration (in light of the ongoing controversies over uranium exports and 
Indian students), clearly there is no expectation in New Delhi that the 
Australia-India relationship will become an essential pillar of regional 
security. 
What is the Significance of the Security Declaration? 
Should the Australia-India Declaration be seen primarily in terms of plugging 
a missing bilateral linkage between members of the putative Quadrilateral?  
Some have argued that, in effect, this new bilateral link signifies the 
development of the Quadrilateral relationship among the Australia, India, the 
United States and Japan even if without a formal multilateral mechanism—
that what might be seen as in effect the “Quad without the Quad” is now set 
to take off as a means of explicit or implicit containment of Chinese 
expansionism.11  There is some element of truth in this perspective.  There 
can be little doubt that the web of security declarations of which the 
Australia-India Declaration forms part provides an implicit message to China 
about the potential for enhanced security cooperation among the Asia-
Pacific maritime democracies.  However, to argue that this web of security 
relationships amounts to such a coalition—even one in nascent form—is a 
significant overstatement.  As the events of 2007 demonstrated, none of 
Australia, India, Japan or the United States were, when it came to it, willing 
to institutionalise a multilateral strategic dialogue in the face of significant 
hostility from China.  Each of the members of the putative Quadrilateral 
rightly concluded that anything that might be perceived as a security coalition 
among the major maritime democracies carried a significant risk of dividing 
the Asia Pacific into opposing blocs and was otherwise inconsistent with the 
objective of integrating China into a regional economic and political system.  
While a series of bilateral security relationships is clearly less provocative to 
China than a multilateral arrangement, the underlying analysis about the 
risks created by any perceived security coalition remains as valid now as it 
was in 2007.  
What then is the long-term significance of the Australia-India Declaration?  
While it seems unlikely that the Australia-India security relationship will 
become an “essential pillar” of regional security architecture, the Declaration 
does at least provide a concrete document around which Australia and India 
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can develop further mechanisms to address shared strategic and security 
interests.  Although New Delhi may not now give high priority to a security 
relationship with Australia (which is not generally seen as an “independent” 
strategic actor due to its close relationship with the United States), arguably 
the value of the security relationship is likely to become more evident over 
time.  Apart from a shared interest in the shape of regional multilateral 
institutions (discussed above), there is significant scope for cooperation in 
the so-called small “s” security fields such as terrorism, law enforcement, 
maritime policing, border security and money laundering.  Moreover, 
Australia and India’s strategic interests will increasingly intersect in 
Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, particularly as India expands its reach 
and influence in those regions.  There is arguably significant scope for 
cooperation, particularly in Southeast Asia.12 
However, there are also likely to be some significant limitations in the 
relationship arising from differing perceptions of regional security.  Most 
obvious is Pakistan.  While India has had some success in “de-hyphenating” 
itself from Pakistan, Australia’s relationship with Pakistan will continue to be 
a matter of significant sensitivity to India—as was recently demonstrated by 
India’s declining to provide naval representation in the Kakadu exercises 
because of the presence of Pakistan.  It seems likely that in order to improve 
its relationship with India, Australia will need to prioritise its relationships in 
this regard.  
A much more significant limitation on Australia’s security relationship with 
India is likely to arise from India’s strategic rivalry with China, particularly in 
the Indian Ocean region.  In particular, the “String of Pearls” theory (that 
China is seeking to “encircle” India with a string of naval bases across the 
Indian Ocean) is strongly held in some circles in New Delhi in contrast with a 
degree of skepticism expressed by Australian analysts.13  The “String of 
Pearls” has been used to justify a significant expansion in Indian naval 
capabilities as well as the development of Indian naval facilities across the 
Indian Ocean.  In recent years the expansion of India’s sphere of influence in 
the Indian Ocean has included the establishment of Indian logistical facilities 
in Oman,14 electronic monitoring facilities in Madagascar,15 naval 
reconnaissance and electronic monitoring facilities in the Maldives16 and 
arrangements with Indian Ocean states such as Mozambique, Mauritius and 
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Seychelles involving the provision of maritime security by India either alone 
or on a joint basis.  India has also for some years sought (in cooperation with 
littoral states) a direct security role in the Malacca Strait, the key choke point 
between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, at least partly driven by a desire to 
control China’s sea lines of communications.17  
Whether or not these developments have added to India’s security, they 
have certainly increased China’s security dilemma in relation to its key sea 
lines of communication from the Middle East and across the Indian Ocean.  
In short, these developments raise the prospect of heightened naval rivalry 
between India and China in the Indian Ocean, something in which Australia 
is unlikely to want to become involved.  As a result, Australia is likely to want 
to see India “de-hyphenate” itself from China in its relationship with Australia.  
One could argue that, as the Quadrilateral episode demonstrated, the 
India—Australia security relationship is only likely develop as a meaningful 
relationship if it is divorced from the idea that the relationship forms a 
subsidiary part of an anti-China coalition.  The separation of the Australia-
India relationship from the China factor would also be consistent with recent 
changes in emphasis in the US-India relationship.  Whereas the Bush 
administration made it clear that it wished to see India develop as a strategic 
counterweight to China throughout Asia, the Obama administration has 
given been much more circumspect in allowing the China factor to be seen 
as an important part of the relationship, preferring to emphasise India’s role 
in South Asia.18  Such an approach, it is argued, would be consistent with 
Australia’s interests. 
Conclusion 
The Australia-India Declaration is a notable step in the development of the 
bilateral security relationship, particularly in creating a framework to facilitate 
long overdue improvements in cooperation between Australia and India in 
the small “s” security areas, including terrorism, law-enforcement and 
maritime policing.  However, one should not expect too much too soon in the 
security relationship.  India clearly has other strategic relationships with a 
higher priority (which include the United States, Japan and even Singapore), 
and has different security pre-occupations than does Australia.  Apart from 
some specific issues (such as Australia’s willingness to supply uranium to 
India), New Delhi does not yet regard Canberra as a key strategic 
interlocutor on which it is worth expending a significant degree of energy.  
That perception may change in coming years as India continues to expand 
its influence in the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia. 
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